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CRITICAL APPROACHES TO COMPARATIVE EDUCATION

VERTICAL CASE STUDIES FROM AFRICA, EUROPE, THE MIDDLE EAST, AND THE AMERICAS

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Chapter 10

The Relief-Development Transition
Sustainability and Educational Support in Post-Conflict Settings

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In recent decades, *sustainability* has become a keyword in international development circles and an overarching objective for work across a wide array of social projects, including education. Yet, no widely accepted definition or operational guidelines exist that adequately describe its meaning. Furthermore, much of the discussion about sustainability in international development discourse presumes a certain degree of social, political, and economic stability in the country or context in question. What, then, does sustainability mean in so-called fragile states? In particular, what does the sustainability of educational support look like in the transition from humanitarian relief in an unstable emergency context to a more stable situation of economic and educational development? How is the concept of sustainability recontextualized when programs originally developed by international development institutions for an emergency context are revised, elements discontinued, and fledgling national governments assume responsibility for the provision of educational services from international organizations?

The goal of this chapter is to answer these questions through a vertical case study that illuminates the range of opportunities, challenges, and contradictions facing educational sustainability in post-conflict contexts. To do so, it examines the efforts of the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) to sustain the *Teacher Emergency Package* (TEP) in Angola, both
during and after the conflict that affected the country for 27 years. NRC’s work with the TEP provides fertile ground for examining sustainability due to the longevity of the program in Angola, which spanned the acute emergency and post-conflict phases. Its work also permits an examination of the friction in educational development projects like this one that are themselves sustained by global connections among international donor organizations and national ministries and policymakers. Returning to this metaphor as discussed by Bartlett and Vavrus in the introduction, the interactions among the various policy actors in this case led not only to debate about the future of the TEP, but they also resulted in “new arrangements of culture and power” within the education sector in Angola (Tsing 2005, 5). As discussed below, NRC endeavored to transfer the TEP to the Angolan government and other international organizations as the country moved into a post-conflict phase, with NRC planning to withdraw from the country once the situation stabilized. The interactions necessitated by this transfer illustrate the changing dynamics of power among international organizations and between them and their national counterparts during the critical relief-to-development transition. In Angola, this friction affected NRC’s ability to transfer the TEP in its entirety to the Angolan government, thereby compromising its sustainability but also creating new opportunities to integrate certain human, material, and physical resources into the recovering educational system. The resultant effect of this friction, I contend, can best be described as policy bricolage, a strategy the Angolan Ministry of Education (MOE) and relevant international organizations needed to employ in order to adapt, implement, and sustain TEP. As Koyama and Max illustrate in chapters 1 and 2, respectively, this process of improvisation is an underacknowledged part of educational policy studies. The subsequent chapters by Shriberg and Zakharina support my argument that bricolage is especially common in fragile states, whose post-conflict education policies are often “wired together” from the remnants of programs developed before and during an emergency. Together, these notions of friction and bricolage help to make sense of the ways in which inter/national development decision making is profoundly local in the sense that it, too, is inflicted by situated interests that are amplified in post-conflict contexts.

Angola: Civil Conflict and Reconstruction

In 1975, Angola gained independence from the Portuguese and ended 14 years of warfare by the Popular Liberation Movement of Angola (MPLA), the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), and the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) (International Crisis Group 2003). Despite shared goals to overthrow the Portuguese, these various groups never coalesced (Bethke and Braunschweig 2003). On the heels of independence, internal conflict ensued, primarily between the socialist, government-backed MPLA, which was supported by the Soviet Union and Cuba and led by José Eduardo dos Santos (president since 1979), and the rebel-led UNITA, which was backed by the United States and South Africa and led by Jonas Savimbi. The conflation of ethnic tensions, regional disparities among different ethnic groups, cold war politics, and other countries’ self-serving interests in Angola’s oil and diamond resources exacerbated the MPLA-UNITA conflict (International Crisis Group 2003).

Angola’s natural resources were grossly exploited during the armed conflict, and the revenues from diamonds and oil filled both the MPLA and UNITA coffers. A corrupt wartime economy, involving the national oil company known as SONANGOL, created a financial system through which money flowed but never appeared in the accounting records. According to Malaquias (2007), the oil revenues disappeared into a “Bermuda triangle comprising… SONANGOL, the president’s office, and the central bank” (230). One study concluded that, during the last five years of the war (1997–2002), at least $4 billion simply disappeared (IMF 2003).

Although widespread fighting has not resumed since the end of the war in 2002, the corruption that was endemic to the 27-year civil conflict in Angola continues today. Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI) ranks Angola 147th out of 179 countries, with an overall score of 2.2 on a 0 (highly corrupt) to 10 (highly clean) scale. Despite being categorized as a fragile state due to its history of conflict and accompanying corruption, Angola’s oil resources have attracted the interest of investors. China, in particular, has invested heavily and granted the country billions of dollars in loans for which credit was secured against future oil production (La Franiere 2007). Despite these growing investments and the country’s abundant natural resources, post-war conditions have not improved significantly for the average Angolan citizen.

As a fragile state, Angola faces significant challenges providing basic services, including education, to its populace. Such states are characterized as countries with a “lack of political commitment and/or weak capacity to develop and implement pro-poor policies,” and they often face particular challenges in development projects (Rose and Greely 2006, 1). This is because some international development organizations
avoid fragile states due to their real or perceived instability while others may exert undue influence on the country's decision-making process, making it difficult to discern national from international priorities. Notably, there is growing interest by the international community in the role that education can play in mitigating state fragility and contributing to peace building, which is leading to greater research, advocacy, and policymaking on this topic (Conflict and Education Research Group 2008).

State of the Educational System in Angola

Adding to the complexity of the fragile Angolan context is the country’s limited educational infrastructure. In fact, the country never had a universal education system. Before independence, education was provided almost exclusively to Portuguese immigrants (Bethke and Braunschweig 2003). Despite efforts by Roman Catholic and Protestant missionaries, educational opportunities for Africans were minimal due to the isolation of missionary work from centralized colonial activities (Samuels 1970).

After independence in 1975, the nation was consumed by the civil conflict with UNITA and was unable to focus attention on already limited educational opportunities. The MPLA made some effort to offer education in its controlled and often less affected areas, and UNITA attempted to create its own curriculum and offer some schooling. Nevertheless, the high percentages of children among the internally displaced populations and those recruited by both sides in the fighting greatly hampered children's education (Bethke and Braunschweig 2003). The MPLA and UNITA's overall neglect of education during the conflict highlighted their obsession with the financial benefits of controlling the country’s natural resources (oil for the MPLA and diamonds for UNITA) rather than human development.

At the end of the war in 2002, fewer than half of Angola's children and youth had access to the country’s education system (Watchlist 2002). The civil conflict's damage and destruction of approximately 4,000 schools also stymied efforts to rejuvenate the education sector (ReliefWeb 2004). Government spending on education in Angola has been one of the lowest in Sub-Saharan Africa, with only 2.6 percent of Gross Domestic Product and 6.4 percent of total government expenditures allocated to education (UNDP 2007). Many teachers were semi-literate, underprepared, and underpaid, and they relied predominantly on teaching methods that promoted rote memorization and a teacher-centered pedagogy.

The MOE in Angola launched a reform of the general education system in 2004 in an effort to respond to the country's major educational challenges. These included unequal access to education for learners; very limited educational infrastructure (e.g., classrooms and schools); insufficient quality and quantity of teaching personnel; insufficient supply of equipment and instructional materials; weak administrative and pedagogical management of teaching institutions; and the related devaluation of the teaching profession (Grilo 2006). UNICEF and other international organizations helped to shape the educational reform in an effort to closely align the objectives with the educational targets outlined in the Education for All and the Millennium Development Goals. The implementation of the reform was envisioned as a long-term, phased process that would reinforce the right to compulsory primary schooling, reduce drop out rates, and construct and rehabilitate schools. Before these reforms and during the civil conflict, several international organizations, including Save the Children and Christian Children’s Fund, were working in the education sector in Angola to provide educational support to children whose schooling had been interrupted. One of the most active organizations, in terms of its scope of work and tenure in Angola, was the NRC.

Inter/national Influences in Angola: The NRC

The NRC, a humanitarian nongovernmental organization (NGO) that provides assistance to refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs), worked in Angola from 1995 to 2007 in an effort to respond to the humanitarian and early reconstruction needs of the Angolan population. During its 12-year tenure, NRC’s humanitarian activities consisted of camp and transit center operations for refugees and IDPs, including the provision and reconstruction of shelter, latrines, and water wells; food and supply distribution; training of health care workers; advocacy, information, counseling, and legal assistance for returnees; and emergency education (Norwegian Refugee Council 2002). The crux of NRC’s education work in Angola during these 12 years was the TEP. It entailed two core components: a teacher training program for under- and unqualified teachers, and a bridging program that granted children who were behind in or who had never been to school the opportunity to re-enter or enter the formal education system. The TEP had been developed
originally by UNESCO’s Programme for Education in Emergencies and Reconstruction (UNESCO PEER) based in Nairobi. UNESCO PEER developed the TEP for use in Somalia in the early 1990s amid the country’s civil conflict; it was later used with refugees in Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Yemen. The original package, developed by UNESCO PEER, consisted of a kit of didactic materials and a methodology for teaching basic literacy and numeracy in the first language of the learners. UNESCO PEER’s TEP, described as a “school-in-a-box,” was intended as a rapid educational response program during the humanitarian phase of a crisis.

Studying Policy Actor Friction and the Bricolage of Educational Policymaking

To generate a broader understanding of the ways in which educational support may or may not be sustained through the transition from a period of crisis to long-term development, this chapter draws upon a larger qualitative study that had two overarching goals. The first was to create a frame of reference at the international level about the critical factors that affect sustainability within the field of education in emergencies and post-crisis reconstruction by interviewing educational practitioners working in the headquarters’ offices of different types of international organizations active in this field. The second goal was to examine, by using these critical factors identified at the international level, a specific example in a conflict-affected country of one international organization’s efforts to sustain an education program in the transition from relief to development. The application of a vertical case study methodology for this research study facilitated a more holistic understanding of sustainability through the examination of its complexities in and across the municipal, provincial, national, and international levels as well as the range of organizational actors active in each level. Data for this study were collected between March 2007 and February 2008, and it entailed interviews with 12 representatives from international organizations located in Europe and the United States and involved in global emergency education efforts. It also included interviews with 33 key stakeholders associated with the TEP program at the local and national levels in Angola and visits to 3 provinces (Luanda, Cuanza Sul, and Zaire) to discuss the program with municipal, provincial, and national education authorities as well as international NGO staff. The data presented in this chapter stem primarily from the fieldwork conducted in Angola.

Implementing and Sustaining the TEP in Angola: Challenges, Opportunities, and Contradictions

In 1995, with support from an education adviser at NRC headquarters, UNICEF conducted a feasibility study to determine whether the TEP was an appropriate program for Angola. At the conclusion of this study, the two organizations decided that NRC, with financial assistance from the Norwegian government, would become the lead agency in adapting the TEP to the Angolan context; NRC had also begun other humanitarian activities in Angola at this time, as stated earlier. During the adaptation process, an NRC staff member collaborated with a trainer from UNESCO PEER, staff members from the Angolan MOE, curriculum specialists from a local teacher training institute, and education colleagues from the UNICEF office in Angola (Norwegian Refugee Council 1998). This team of individuals worked to preserve the child-centered and participatory methodologies that were central to the original UNESCO PEER program, but they modified other aspects of the program both early on and throughout NRC’s involvement with the TEP in Angola. These fundamental changes included the following: the six-month nonformal education program was extended to align with the formal education sector’s nine-month calendar; the one-off teacher training sessions were extended over time to a modular, in-service format spanning seven weeks to respond to the needs of under- and unqualified teachers; a supervisory component was added in an effort to complement the teacher training modules and to provide ongoing in-service support to teachers; the target age group for the program was changed in 2002 from 10–13 years old to 12–17 years old to facilitate younger children’s direct access to the formal system and to accommodate the enormous backlog of adolescents and youth who had been out of school; and traditional Angolan stories and texts were collected to supplement UNESCO PEER materials in different subject areas. In addition to these modifications, the program also responded to changes brought about by the Ministry’s own education reforms that sought to augment the curriculum with the inclusion of topics prioritized by the Ministry and its international partners, including human rights and HIV/AIDS. Over time, NRC was able to gradually transfer responsibility for compensating the TEP teachers and supervisors to the Angolan government, though, as Shriberg discusses in the following chapter, the compensation may not have been adequate to meet teachers’ needs. The Angolan MOE’s involvement from the beginning with the adaptation of the TEP—a critical exercise for generating ownership of the program in the early stages—and the later transfer of
NRC and the Angolan MOE: Shifting Priorities

Given the magnitude of the TEP program, NRC understood the need to cultivate strong relationships with the MOE at the national, provincial, and municipal government levels, and it actively sought to build them throughout the course of NRC’s tenure in Angola. A strong relationship with the Ministry was vital because the overarching goal was for the government to assume responsibility for the TEP as a way to sustain it. In a process of interactional improvisation, the relationships and modes of collaboration with the Ministry, as well as other international organizations working in Angola, manifested in different ways, at different levels, and at different times. The friction among these inter/national actors and organizations kept the TEP transition moving, though at times it facilitated and at other times it hampered the policy reform process.

The opportunities for NRC to develop supportive relationships and to instill a strong commitment to the TEP within the MOE proved to be most successful at the provincial and municipal levels. The exposure of the provincial and municipal education authorities to the TEP provided these individuals with multiple opportunities to observe and learn about the program’s methodology, which led to requests by Provincial Departments of Education for assistance to train teachers and supervisors from the formal education system. One staff member from NRC headquarters stated that at one point: “The Ministry discovered that the children in TEP were in many cases performing better than the same-aged children who had been in school regularly . . . and they discovered that there must be a reason for this. The differences were the methodology and the attitude of the teachers, etc. Then NRC was asked to train all first and second grade teachers in two provinces” (Interview, April 15, 2007). As a result of this request, NRC staff felt, “The provincial education authorities had obviously understood the participatory methodology and the importance of follow-up and supervision, and they appreciated[d] the capacity that had been built in their areas.” (Interview, April 15, 2007).

Due to the longevity of the TEP in Angola, in many cases education authorities were found at the provincial and municipal levels who began as teachers or supervisors and had participated in the TEP training, thereby bringing their understanding of and training in the program to their work within the Provincial and Municipal Departments of Education. Other participants interviewed at the provincial level had performed dual roles in the formal education system and the TEP, and they commented about the cross-fertilization that occurred. As one staff member from an international organization affiliated with the program pointed out, the result is that “it’s very easy to see [the TEP] as a government program” (Interview, March 21, 2007).

The TEP training proved to be such a success that in some instances the provincial education authorities immediately recruited teachers upon completion of their TEP training. Although this was a boon for government education officials, it did hamper NRC’s own goal of expanding the program. According to one NRC staff member, this “abrupt absorption of teachers trained in the TEP into the regular schools prevented [NRC from] reaching the goals foreseen in the project” (Interview, October 15, 2007). Nonetheless, the hiring of TEP-trained teachers was also a clear indication of its success. The widespread appreciation of the TEP methodology at the provincial and municipal levels, and the education authorities’ growing interest in and requests for training, created opportunities for the TEP to seep into the formal education system.

Although there seemed to be strong and continuous recognition of the TEP’s contributions to the Angolan education system at the subnational level, this support was less secure at the MOE. As the country transitioned from a state of conflict to a more stable, development-oriented context, participants noted a decline of support for the TEP at the national level. They identified two different but somewhat related reasons for this change: one, the Angolan government’s shifting orientation from decentralized to centralized decision making; and two, the challenges for international organizations to maintain personnel, especially people with the requisite skills needed to carry out a particular type of work.

Regarding (de-)centralization, the TEP was initially endorsed by the national MOE, and the NRC (in collaboration with UNICEF and the Ministry) was able to expand the TEP over time to 12 of the 18 provinces in Angola. During the civil conflict, the provincial and municipal education authorities were able to make fairly autonomous decisions about the implementation of the TEP in their respective areas. However, after the war had ended and the national government grew stronger, a movement toward a more centralized education system appeared to be underway.

One important example of the government’s shift toward a more centralized system entailed its development of a new literacy and accelerated learning program (ALP)—Alfabetização e Aprendizagem Escolar—in 2007 for overage students who had missed out on formal schooling (República de Angola 2005). The ALP consisted of six years of schooling compressed into
three with the opportunity to transfer to secondary school upon successful completion of the program cycle. The program presented older students the opportunity to complete a full cycle of primary education. Although the program had been designed for adolescents and youth more than 15 years of age, students younger than 15 were allowed to participate in the first module of the program and then transfer into the appropriate grade within the primary school system. In the development process for the ALP, the Ministry sought out NRC's TEP expertise. In fact, a staff member from an NGO familiar with the TEP who attended one of the planning sessions in Luanda noted that all of the materials distributed by the Ministry to the participants during the meeting were merely a repackaging of the TEP materials that had been supplied during the developmental stages of the government's program.

Though they used TEP materials, experiences, and human resources, the Ministry did not take into consideration all of NRC's suggestions for ALP. The main source of contention between NRC staff and the Ministry had to do with the number of hours dedicated to classroom instruction. The government's ALP called for 12 hours of instruction per week compared to the 25-30 set forth in the TEP. This caused much concern not only for NRC, but also for UNICEF, both of which acknowledged the contradiction of trying to launch an accelerated program that condenses six years of schooling into three with fewer hours of weekly instruction. NRC and UNICEF expressed their concerns to the Ministry and tried to advocate for a review of this issue, but the national Ministry responded by stating that the reduction in hours stemmed from the lack of available classroom space to accommodate the target number of adolescents and youth they hoped to reach with this program—approximately 100,000 students per year (Interview, April 2, 2007). Some international organization representatives felt that their objections made it very difficult for them to discuss the ALP with the Ministry, and some NGO staff members suggested that the Ministry's interest in reaching a large number of people before the upcoming elections trumped the need for quality education (Interview, February 13, 2008).

Although NRC, and other international organizations, supported the MOE's efforts to take the lead in designing and implementing new education policies and programs, there was also concern about the sustainability of the TEP, especially in terms of the teachers, supervisors, and trainers affiliated with the program. A representative from the national MOE who participated in this study stated that the TEP would figure centrally in the new ALP. She noted that the Ministry already recognized teachers and supervisors affiliated with the TEP as well as the materials that had been developed over the years. According to her, the TEP experience would be "completely absorbed both in terms of human resources and material resources" (Interview, April 2, 2007).

For this reason, the Ministry's plans to incorporate TEP resources into the ALP were considered positive actions by NRC because they showed evidence of sustainability, at least for the human resources developed through TEP. However, it was unclear how quickly the new program would be implemented because core components of the education reform that were initiated in 2002 (i.e., didactic and administrative materials) had yet to reach significant portions of the country. The slow pace of the reform did not suggest to NRC staff that the ALP would be implemented any more rapidly. Considering that more than 50 percent of Angola's population is younger than 30, the implications of delayed or lost educational or equivalent vocational training are enormous (Grilo 2006).

There, a number of provincial and municipal education authorities wanted to continue the TEP to meet the needs of youth in their regions. Yet the centralized decision making meant that these local officials had to abide by the Ministry's decision to focus solely on the new ALP program.

Interviewees believed that another reason for the Ministry's waver- ing support of the TEP had to do with international organizations' own internal personnel-related challenges. Staff turnover can be pervasive in international organizations working in conflict-affected contexts due to the demanding nature of the work. It proved to be a serious challenge for NRC and UNICEF, with implications for stable relationships with education authorities. As one participant put it:

The problem is that there hasn't been continuity with the people working there [in the capital] with this program on the NRC side. They have been changing and all these educational coordinators have different ideas. Being head of office at NRC in Angola there are many other things that you have to pay attention to so maybe they aren't paying enough attention to this program. (Interview, November 7, 2007)

Although staff turnover inhibited interaction and communication with the national MOE, there was also the challenge posed by the non-Angolan staff who lacked skills in Portuguese and relevant cultural knowledge to interact effectively with education authorities. According to one participant who had interacted with the various NRC expatriate staff in Luanda over the years, NRC staff members' proficiency in Portuguese may not have been strong enough if they wanted to be able to advocate and negotiate effectively with education authorities, most of whom did not know English or Norwegian. A number of other Angolans also suggested to
me that NRC staff needed a better understanding of the culture in the MOE—and in Angola more broadly—to establish a presence, build relationships, and navigate an inherently complex environment.

Whereas international NGOs can be highly effective in delivering services and building capacity, particularly at the community level, the ability of expatriate staff to cultivate ongoing collaborative relationships with education authorities at the national level presents a challenge. Longer-term engagement at the national level would allow international NGOs to better anticipate and assess changing political landscapes that may have the potential to influence the implementation and sustainability of their education programs. It may also be helpful for international NGOs to assist local education authorities who are collaborating with successful education programs in their efforts to communicate with their national MOE, thereby generating greater support for the program’s ongoing implementation. Yet organizations such as NRC do not only need to build strong relationships at the local and national levels; they also work within a network of international educational development organizations whose members may support or oppose their in-country efforts. Such was the case in the relationship among NRC and UNICEF in their work on the TEP, which is explored in the following section.

Collaboration and Conflict between NRC, UNICEF, and the Angolan MOE

Throughout the development of TEP, NRC attempted to establish partnerships with a variety of organizations working in Angola. While several organizations contributed to the TEP over the years, NRC’s relationship with UNICEF was particularly important vis-à-vis the topic of sustainability for two primary reasons: one, UNICEF plays an extremely influential role with the Angolan MOE, a role that had the potential to create as well as limit opportunities for other international organizations; and two, the organization typically has a longer-term presence than other NGOs, particularly those with humanitarian mandates, because UNICEF works on long-term development projects as well as shorter-term humanitarian ones.

After the first two years of TEP’s implementation in Angola, the Norwegian government—the main donor for the TEP—requested that UNICEF and NRC collaborate more formally. The two organizations signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) in September 1998 in an effort to coordinate TEP-related tasks and responsibilities (Norwegian Refugee Council 1998). The MOU explained that NRC would be responsible for all training involving the teachers, trainers, and supervisors while UNICEF would be responsible for the implementation of the program. These implementation responsibilities consisted of collaboration with provincial and municipal education authorities regarding selection of teachers and supervisors; the integration of TEP students and teachers into the formal education system; distribution of TEP kits and materials for school construction; and, at times, transportation for TEP supervisors (Johannessen 2000).

In 2000, a tripartite agreement was signed between NRC, UNICEF, and the MOE in order to strengthen further the collaboration in regard to the TEP; however, the language of the agreement was loosely constructed and cited as a weakness in an evaluation of the TEP carried out in 2000 by an external evaluator hired by NRC. According to the evaluator, the tripartite agreement “describe[d] a division of responsibilities between the parties, but lack[ed] details on the areas and modes of cooperation” or on the “the hierarchy between the parties” (Johannessen 2000, 5). Despite the fact that NRC and UNICEF had initiated the TEP, the overall goal for the government was gradually to assume responsibility for this program in an effort to ensure the program’s sustainability. The details for how and when the government would assume these responsibilities were never clearly accounted for in the agreement, posing difficulties for the sustainability of the program.

Although UNICEF remained involved to varying degrees with the implementation of the TEP over the years, numerous obstacles surfaced that proved frustrating to NRC and others collaborating on the TEP. Whereas NGOs tend to act quickly and nimbly in the coordination and management of their activities, UN agencies often become bogged down by their own bureaucracies (Reddy 2002). In the case of the UNICEF office in Luanda, this bureaucracy created delays for the procurement and distribution of didactic materials needed for the kit and the allocation of funds to partners involved in the implementation of the program (e.g., financial resources provided for teachers’ accommodations and meals during TEP training sessions) (Interview, April 15, 2007).

Apart from the administrative delays that accompanied the collaboration between NRC and UNICEF, NRC staff were concerned about the ways in which UNICEF did or did not keep NRC informed about key information. In the early years, TEP coordinators were dissuaded from attending meetings that UNICEF scheduled with the MOE to discuss TEP. They were also not provided with updated information about the outcomes of UNICEF decisions that might have affected the implementation of the TEP.
There was a sense among the NRC staff that these challenges not only led to avoidable delays but that they also interfered with the provision of educational support. One NRC staff member felt strongly that the various administrative delays over the years had often “lowered the intervention capacity of NRC and [created] some obstacles in the realization of capacity building courses for the teachers” (Interview, October 15, 2007). These challenges of collaborating with UNICEF prompted NRC to assume more responsibilities over the years, especially given the enormity of its investment in this program. In contrast, UNICEF’s priorities slowly shifted away from the TEP, so less attention was given to it. Considering UNICEF’s influential relationship with the national MOE, its waning interest in the TEP may have negatively affected the relationship between NRC and the MOE.

The limited technical knowledge about the TEP among UNICEF staff due to extensive turnover also affected its ability to support the TEP adequately and collaborate with NRC effectively. Despite the presence of some highly qualified UNICEF personnel who were considered visionaries by some NRC staff and affiliated consultants, staff turnover at the UNICEF office in Angola and the inability of those who followed to engage at a deeper, more technical level with the TEP proved to be particularly problematic. There also was agreement among those whom I interviewed that UNICEF may have lacked the vision as well as the interest for this type of project. The following statement spoke to the feelings among NRC staff that their efforts to engage UNICEF in the TEP were often fruitless: “You have some people from UNICEF who politely listen to you and then say, ‘yes, we’ll see,’ and you knew not so much would happen. That was the kind of feeling that we got…you knew that they were busy doing [other things] and they didn’t have the [human] resources to carry it through” (Interview, November 19, 2007).

Although the bureaucracy of UNICEF and the problems that accompany it can be found in other countries, the NRC staff with experiences working elsewhere in collaboration with UNICEF noted that the relationship with this UN agency in Angola was particularly problematic. The reasons primarily stemmed from the frequent changes in leadership in senior education management positions within the organization. This was a particular problem for NRC as it planned to withdraw from Angola. It needed UNICEF to be well informed about the TEP and the ways in which it had and might continue to inform the new ALP, particularly with regard to leveraging the vast human, material, and physical resources that NRC had created over the years. The lack of institutional memory about the TEP and NRC at the UNICEF office in Angola proved to be a serious limitation for sustaining the program.

Sustaining the TEP in Angola

In the case of Angola, the Ministry’s decision to develop the ALP changed the country’s educational landscape. It became less about NRC transferring an intact program to the government, as stated in the original goals for TEP, and more about transferring certain elements—the human and material resources—into a “new” national system, a bricolage of program and policy pieces that looked promising to the Ministry. Although an NRC staff member commented that the TEP is “only sustainable if the government wants it,” she also thought in hindsight that perhaps a few additional steps could have been taken to ensure the sustainability of the program within the Ministry’s education reform policies (Interview, April 15, 2007). NRC made several efforts of varying success to establish and fortify collaborative relationships with other international organizations such as UNICEF throughout TEP’s implementation, but the interaction among them—the friction—inhibited new partnerships from being formed that could have contributed to the sustainability of TEP.

While the TEP enjoyed broad-based support within the Provincial and Municipal Departments of Education, this was not necessarily the case with the MOE as it grew stronger and sought to put its own imprimatur on existing programs. Moreover, the challenges of working with organizations that could have influenced the Ministry over the long term, such as UNICEF, highlight the difficulties in sustaining programs developed in the context of a humanitarian crisis as a country embarks on a more stable, development-oriented trajectory. Ultimately, the sustainability of the TEP depended on a complex series of improvisations and interactions between actors differentially situated in sites ranging from local Angolan schools through municipal and district educational offices to Luanda, Norway, New York, and beyond.

Concluding Thoughts on Managing Sustainability in Post-Conflict Contexts

The findings presented in this chapter capture several of the opportunities, challenges, and contradictions common to efforts to sustain inter/national development programs, especially in fragile states and post-conflict situations. In this case, the NRC’s attempts to sustain the TEP collided not only with the Angolan government’s efforts to establish its legitimacy and exert its independence during the post-conflict transition to development...
but also with the divergent goals of other international development organizations. Similar to Taylor and Wilkinson's chapters, decentralized governmental structures created opportunities for wider participation by local education authorities across Angola's provinces, in this case during a civil war. However, once the country stabilized and the national MOE began shifting toward a more centralized structure, the local education authorities' opportunities to continue their engagement with the TEP began to dwindle. As a result of these shifting governance structures, new interactional patterns emerged among international development organizations and with national ministries. This friction kept the transfer of TEP moving along, but the road along which it traveled was interrupted by the ALP. The resulting bricolage joined certain elements related to the human, material, and physical resources generated during the life of the TEP with policy reforms sought by the post-conflict MOE; the transfer of the program in its entirety to the Angolan government did not occur as NRC had intended.

Nevertheless, the recognition by education authorities of the positive contributions that NRC made to building the capacity of Angolan teachers, supervisors, and trainers augured well for these individuals' integration into the governmental system. This integration entailed the inclusion of the majority of TEP teachers on the governmental payroll during TEP's implementation as well as the ongoing incorporation of TEP teachers, supervisors, and trainers into the formal education system. It also included the utilization of TEP material resources on curriculum, pedagogy, and training in the development of the ALP. Finally, the exposure to TEP that education authorities at the municipal and provincial levels received enhanced their knowledge and understanding of the program and may very well influence their work in the future. The ways in which the organization implemented the TEP in a complementary manner in Angola and the subsequent integration and appropriation of the core components of TEP into the MOE's new ALP illustrates one example of what sustainability might look like in a country transitioning from protracted conflict to long-term development.

The vertical case study approach used for this study facilitated a closer examination of the various and evolving relationships among ministries of education, international NGOs, and UN agencies. It shed light on the importance of looking at these inter/national interactions as local encounters, profoundly shaped by the friction resulting from shifting political priorities and policy alliances, as further illustrated in the remaining chapters in this section. This chapter also demonstrated that policy influence does not move unidirectionally from the global to the national and local. Countries do resist as well as reshape policies and practices originating from international organizations, even in post-conflict contexts when states are often the most fragile, as chapter 12 by Zakharia illustrates. Moreover, the result is often a bricolage rather than a wholesale adoption of an intact program, which may better serve the long-term interests of the country. At the same time, initiating new policies and carrying them out may require ongoing assistance from the international community, a point that Shroberg's chapter to follow on Liberia makes vividly clear. In Angola and other fragile states, it is critical to explore effective ways to strike a balance between the assistance that international organizations can provide and the government's need to lead its country's educational reforms. Perhaps striking this balance in the post-conflict period rather than sustaining programs developed amid crisis should be the primary goal of international organizations.

Notes

1. The term "fragile state" is relatively new and generally refers to countries susceptible to conflict because of recent or anticipated domestic or international strife, and with very weak institutions to withstand or prevent such conflict (Crisis States Workshop 2006). The determination of state fragility is generally tied to a country's ranking in the World Bank's Country Policy and Institutional Assessments (CPIA); countries included in these assessments may or may not be affected by violent conflict but are seen as vulnerable to such conflicts. The following section provides further elaboration of the term in the Angolan context.

2. The number of hours of instruction for general education courses within the formal education sector total approximately 20 hours per week.